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Food systems have become a pivotal issue on the global agenda, highlighted by the United Nations’ Food Systems Summit in September 2021. Despite their centrality and long-standing regulation, these systems often produce negative outcomes and fail to address critical challenges like eradicating hunger and malnutrition, particularly in the Global South. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 2.4 billion people globally experience food insecurity, with more than 30% suffering from severe hunger. Meanwhile, over one billion people struggle with obesity, and widespread dietary deficiencies persist due to insufficient intake of essential vitamins and micronutrients. In most agrarian economies of the Global South, agriculture remains the primary livelihood for two-thirds of working adults living in poverty. This makes its inclusive transformation essential to achieving poverty reduction, food and nutrition security, and sustainable development. Example of , a fully globalized value chain: Nutella® value chain map. Extracted from: Scoppola, Margherita. (2021). Globalisation in agriculture and food: the role of multinational enterprises. European Review of Agricultural Economics. 48. 10.1093/erae/jbab032. The surge of sustainable food concept system Traditional agricultural systems have historically focused on ensuring food sovereignty and upholding the human right to food by maximizing productivity and affordability. However, modern and globalized agricultural practices, while productive, have introduced significant environmental and social costs. Dependence on chemical inputs like fertilizers and pesticides has degraded soil and water resources, while globalization has increased greenhouse gas emissions and contributed to climate change. Human health has also suffered, with ultra-processed foods fueling obesity, and in the Global North, excess meat consumption driving non-communicable diseases. Moreover, agricultural workers and food chain staff face persistent vulnerabilities, as demonstrated during widespread protests and the COVID-19 pandemic. Sustainable food systems provide an integrated response to these challenges. According to the FAO, food systems encompass the actors and activities involved in food production, distribution, consumption, and disposal, embedded in broader social, economic, and environmental contexts. Although this concept has gained attention among civil society, researchers, and policymakers, its implementation remains limited. Only a small portion of the global population is covered by food policies that explicitly incorporate environmental sustainability. The absence of clear intervention points addressing multiple interconnected sectors remains a key barrier. Nevertheless, approaches like regionalizing diets and enhancing food self-sufficiency show promise in shortening supply chains and strengthening system resilience. Europe’s Efforts Toward Sustainable Food Systems In Europe, diet-related non-communicable diseases, which account for 70% of mortality, have placed a significant burden on healthcare systems. Meat consumption remains higher than nutritional requirements, contributing to the EU’s status as a net calorie importer. More than half of the adult population is overweight or obese. While traditional policies like the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) are leading the way for food productive and a set of regulations and laws have established standards for food quality, pollution control, and animal welfare, they lack the impact needed to drive radical change due to entrenched systems and conflicting stakeholder interests. Farmers, for instance, face significant constraints in reducing chemical inputs because of rigid supply chain

Up to 65% of productive land in Africa is degraded, with 45% experiencing desertification. The Sahara-Sahelian zone is among the world’s regions most affected by desertification, land degradation, and climate change. It faces frequent droughts and rainfall variability, leaving its rainfed agriculture highly vulnerable. These environmental challenges are worsened by significant poverty and vulnerability among the 200 million people who live in the region, creating a cycle of low agricultural productivity and persistent rural poverty, often referred to as a poverty trap. The Great Green Wall Initiative (GGWI), initiated in early 2000, is a concerted and robust political and technical response by the Sahel-Saharan States to their environmental and climatic challenges. Although it is not the first initiative of this type in the Sahara-Sahelian zone, its regional scope and global support by the leading international donors make it unprecedented. One should remember that most Sahel-Saharan States are also part of the world’s most fragile and vulnerable states (see Fragile States Index developed by Fund for Peace). With limited institutional capacities, coordinating the several scales of such initiatives, from the global (financing) to the local (for impacts), is a considerable challenge. 1st version of the project: top-down logic undermined Burkina Faso, Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Sudan set up the Great Green Wall Initiative (GGWI) in 2007 which original aim was to plant a 7,000km long, 15km wide tree barrier linking Dakar to Djibouti. The political supervision is ensured by the African Union and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). The Panafrican Agency of GGW (PAAGGW), set up in Chad in 2010, supervises, coordinates and monitors the implementation across the 11 Member States. The Conference of Heads of State ensures diplomatic support, crucial in advocating for the initiative’s international positioning and resource mobilisation. In contrast, the decision-making process depends on a set of committees. The PAAGGW is replicated at each country level through national coordination agencies that are accountable for operational implementation. External funding is routed through donor agencies, financing several large-scale or country-focused programs. Nearly USD 1 billion of financing was committed to transboundary international projects to support the GGWI. Still, according to the UNCCD report, for the 2011-2019 period, the member states reported contributing USD 53.4 million to the GGWI and receiving USD 149 million in external funding. Regional programs participating in the GGWI initiative (initiated before 2020). Table based on The Great Green Wall Implementation Status and Way Ahead to 2030, by UNCCD, accessible at https://www.unccd.int/resources/publications/great-green-wall-implementation-status-and-way-ahead-2030 * BRICKS is a sub-project of SAWAP, so the amount is not added to the others when calculating the total. ** Some projects target more countries than the countries of the GGW initiative *** When possible, only the amount related to activities in the countries of the GGW initiative is considered To achieve its objectives, the approach relied on identifying a strip based on climatological parameters at the regional scale, then refined by national experts taking account of specific bio-physical, sociological and priority features (national scale). A

The leadership of Brazil to reverse the anticipated failure of SDG 2 – Achieving zero hunger Brazil’s President Lula recently announced the Global Alliance Against Hunger launch, scheduled to coincide with the G20 Leaders Summit, which he will preside over in November 2024. In his statement, Lula emphasised the importance of tackling hunger and poverty, which are closely intertwined. This commitment relates to Brazil’s remarkable history in fighting against hunger at the national level. Between 1990 and 2015, the country nearly quartered the population living in extreme poverty and hunger, from 15% (22.3 million people) to less than 2% (4.2 million), according to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). This success demonstrates the strides achieved through acknowledging food security and nutrition as multifaceted challenges. The Zero Hunger Program of the 2000s In 2003, a year after assuming the Brazilian presidency, Lula launched the Zero Hunger Program to address hunger in the country. This programme included a range of public initiatives within diverse sectors of public action and associated ministries. It involved long-term interventions to tackle underlying causes such as inequality, poverty, and social exclusion, as well as short-term measures to ensure immediate access to food through regular and emergency programmes. The presidency also impulsed the reassembling and strengthening of the advisory body on food security to the presidency, the National Council for Food and Nutrition Security (CONSEA). This Council is responsible for liaising between the government and civil society on food and nutrition security and following up on the implementation of related public policies. Composed of two-thirds of civil society representatives, it embodies the framing of food sovereignty as the right of people to define their own food-related policies and strategies. Moreover, this multi-sectoral approach involved collaboration among federal, state, and local governments. At the core of these initiatives was the Bolsa Família programme, which had an annual budget of approximately US$8 billion from 2010 to 2020 and offered financial assistance to 14 million families. This conditional cash transfer (CCT) programme is one of the largest of its kind globally, tying financial aid to health and education requirements such as school attendance and children’s immunisations. Apart from Bolsa Família, two other significant, budget-supported programmes were integral to this effort: the National Programme for Strengthening Family Farming (PRONAF), which provided loans to support rural farming, and the National School Feeding Programme, which supplied meals to schoolchildren across the country. Besides the Zero Hunger Programme, food security was supported by evolving legal frameworks, a national policy program started in 2010 (National Food and Nutritional Security Policy), and further strengthening of institutions. In 2006, Brazil enacted the Organic Law of Food and Nutrition Security, which includes freedom from hunger and access to adequate food. By 2010, the right to food was recognised as a constitutional right. In summary, combining the policies and programmes with economic improvements—including higher minimum wages and reduced unemployment—resulted in significant reductions in poverty and hunger. By 2014, Brazil had officially exited the Hunger Map, having reduced poverty by

The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), established in 1962, is one of the European Union’s oldest and most significant policies. It is the leading policy for transitioning the EU’s agricultural sector. However, this transition has faced considerable challenges. CAP began incorporating environmental objectives in 1985, but its impact has been limited by political resistance from member states and agricultural groups. The WWF estimates that up to 60% of CAP funding—more than €30 billion annually—harms biodiversity. Furthermore, agriculture is the EU’s second-largest source of greenhouse gas emissions, accounting for 11%, higher than the industrial sector’s (9%). Indeed, 80% of CAP payments benefit less than 20% of recipients, mainly large farms practising conventional agriculture, which implements harmful practices exacerbating biodiversity loss through eutrophication, synthetic fertiliser use, and land degradation while contributing to methane emissions and climate change. In response, the EU has launched an ambitious set of policies to drive environmental transition, in which agriculture plays a significant role, with the European Green Deal (EGD) at the forefront. The EGD aims for a climate-neutral Europe by 2050, reducing emissions by 50-55% from 1990 levels. The Farm to Fork (F2F) strategy declines the Deal for the agriculture sector. It targets a 50% reduction in pesticide use and antibiotics in livestock, a 20% reduction in synthetic fertilisers by 2030, and increasing organic farming from 10% to 25% of agricultural land. For the first time in history, the CAP has been designed to align with this set of policies. The new Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) for 2021-2027 is presented as a significant shift in EU agricultural policy. With a total of €387 billion, it constitutes about 33% of the EU’s budget. This CAP is noteworthy for its increased alignment with EU environmental and climate-change policies through a green architecture. For the first time, 40% of the CAP budget will be climate-relevant. The structure is as follows: In addition, statutory management requirements apply to all farmers, regardless of CAP support. These requirements include EU regulations on public, animal, and plant health, animal welfare, and environmental standards, ensuring that all farmers comply with essential rules designed to protect health and the environment. Pursuing the objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) presents a complex challenge, as it must balance various societal needs and shifts. Firstly, while sustainability is a crucial goal, the CAP must also address other critical objectives, such as food sovereignty and social justice. This multifaceted approach creates a complex policy structure that is difficult to implement, monitor and adhere to at the farm’s level. Secondly, societal changes are necessary to meet CAP’s objectives. For instance, dietary shifts are needed to align with sustainability goals. In the EU, the consumption of livestock products significantly exceeds the recommendations of the World Health Organization (WHO), with animal protein intake being 70% higher than the guidelines. Lastly, CAP cannot be reduced to a purely top-down policy due to the crucial role of political dynamics. The slow progress towards sustainable agriculture reflects this complexity. The political landscape is still hindering

South Asia’s crucial need for improved electricity supply The electricity sector plays a critical role in the sustainable energy transition in South Asia. The region confronts significant challenges in ramping up electricity production to cater to the requirements of a rapidly expanding population and economy. Ensuring sufficient and high-quality power supply is imperative, and doing so can spur economic growth and help lift more than 200 million people out of poverty. South Asian countries are transitioning to a more sustainable energy sector, aiming to significantly increase the proportion of renewable energy in their energy mix by 2030. Bangladesh aims to reach 15%, Pakistan 30%, India 50%, and Sri Lanka 70% of renewable energy. Despite increasing fuel imports for fuel-based power plants, these countries face an energy supply deficit during peak demand periods and significant losses in their power grids. South Asia must enhance its electricity supply in terms of quantity and quality (reliability and efficiency). Interconnection, already implemented in several parts of the world, could be a valuable asset for the region. Interconnection optimisation and increased resilience in the use of regional resources The significant costs incurred from high fuel imports in South Asia cannot be overlooked. According to the World Bank, about two-thirds of the energy used in the region is imported, with fossil fuels making up approximately 80 per cent of energy production. The impact of these imports is evident in the strain they place on the countries’ balance of payments. Sri Lanka, for example, faced a complete fuel shortage in 2022 due to a depleted foreign currency reserve, resulting in a temporary immobilisation of the country. The optimisation potential through complementary supply and demand at the regional level is significant. Nepal and Bhutan, which have up to 40 GW and 24 GW of hydropower potential, are reliant on highly seasonal hydropower. During the wet season, they can sell surplus production to regions facing demand challenges. Conversely, during the dry season, shortages in Nepal and Bhutan can be addressed by importing power from neighbouring countries. An interconnected market brings numerous benefits: Implementation still needs to catch up: what are the next steps? There is a strong and unwavering political commitment to promoting interconnectedness within the region. Several treaties have been implemented to reinforce regional integration, starting with the establishment of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985, as well as the founding of the SAARC Energy Centre in Islamabad, Pakistan, in 2006. The South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) was officially ratified in 2004 to progress towards a unified market. Additionally, the South Asia Regional Energy Coalition (SAREC) was established in 2006 to lead advocacy efforts by influential policy-focused business associations in the region. It is crucial to note that significant progress has been made in implementing interconnections between India and its neighbouring countries, Nepal, Bhutan, and, more recently, Bangladesh. The undersea interconnection between Sri Lanka and India is under study. Additionally, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank are deeply involved in supporting

South Asia: fast developing power sector, high population density and high biodiversity                         South Asia is characterised by high power needs to support rapid growth, and the power sector is one of the most emitters in the area due to its high reliance on fossil fuels. In the context of climate change, the region committed to developing a low-carbon power sector. South Asian countries are implementing a common power market, an essential step towards achieving this low-carbon goal. Bhutan and Nepal will keep developing their hydropower sector, benefiting from their tremendous potential. India is making significant investments in wind and solar power capacity, and so is Sri Lanka, whose hydropotential is almost fully exploited. The region is home to more than 2 billion people, and this high population density makes every piece of land exploited. Plus, there is a high level of biodiversity threat, and impacts on the ecosystem pose a series of problems, including the reduction provision of invaluable resources such as clean water and clean air, both particularly at risk in Bangladesh or even impacts of tourism, which is heavily reliant on wildlife in Sri Lanka. Due to its infrastructure power gap, the rationale of benefiting millions vs affecting a few people is strong and leads to overlooking environmental and social (E&S) when developing power projects. However, lack of appropriate consideration of E&S risks can lead to not only unreversible social and environmental impacts for local communities but also significant delays, increased costs of such projects, sabotage, or even the project’s termination, therefore, failure to provide millions with the power they need. E&S risks and their integration into project planning Low-carbon energies benefit societies through clean energy production; however, they are not exempt from E&S risks. This includes new projects for adding hydro, wind, and solar energy capacities, as well as associated transmission lines connecting generation capacity to the grid. Finalised projects also entail E&S risks, notably when infrastructure can increase vulnerability to extreme events. For example, large hydro-power dams can deepen the risks of floods and landslides, likely to increase due to climate change. One common feature of E&S risks is that they tend to be very localised around the project’s area when the benefits are at a national scale. In addition, water scarcity in the region tends to fuel conflict and is likely to be exacerbated by climate change. Numerous examples of conflicts due to power projects relate directly to E&S risks. For instance:         In India, an estimation for the second half of the 20th century states that approximately 50 million people experienced displacement due to developmental projects, with large dams alone displacing 16 million people. Besides dams, power conflicts extend to solar power; for instance, the solar panels at the 100 Mw solar plant in Maharashtra were vandalised due to non-payment of wages.         In Sri Lanka, environmental complaints can be particularly virulent: in the Mannar area, the Mannar Asia flyway is a significant bird corridor and many protected wetlands, all being internationally recognised

Meloni’s visit to China is viewed as President Xi Jinping’s new diplomatic triumph in Europe as the two countries seem to be starting a new wave of cooperation. Yet the cooperation is nothing new. The relationship between Italy and China has always been a tapestry of economic interdependence, political maneuvering, and cultural exchanges. The recent shifts and nuances in this bilateral relationship should be analyzed particularly in the context of global events and Italy’s decision to withdraw from China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Economic Synergies and Divergences The economic relationship between Italy and China has been a vibrant testament to the potential for mutual growth and prosperity through international trade and investment. The narrative of their economic synergies is particularly highlighted by the period of Italy’s involvement in China’s ambitious BRI. During this time, there was a remarkable expansion in trade volumes, with a staggering 50% increase in Chinese exports to Italy and a commendable 48% growth in Italian exports to China. This period saw an unprecedented surge in economic activity, indicating the strong complementarities of both economies. However, this economic boom came with its own set of challenges. A significant and widening trade deficit emerged, casting a shadow over the seemingly harmonious economic exchange. The asymmetry in trade indicated that while both countries benefited from the increased trade, the balance was not equal, with implications for the long-term sustainability of such a relationship. As Italy navigates the post-BRI era, there is a discernible shift in its economic strategy towards China. The recalibration is characterized by a pursuit of a more balanced and equitable trade relationship. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has been vocal about the need for a level playing field in trade, cautioning against a lopsided economic dynamic that could potentially favor one side over the other. This recalibration is not merely a political stance but is reflected in tangible actions and agreements. During Prime Minister Meloni’s visit to Beijing, several new agreements were signed, signaling a renewed commitment to deepen cooperation in key sectors of the economy. The focus on electric mobility and renewable energies is particularly noteworthy, as these sectors are not only economically significant but also align with global efforts towards sustainability and environmental conservation. The agreements reached during Meloni’s visit are indicative of a strategic pivot towards sectors that promise long-term benefits and are poised for growth. Electric mobility, for instance, is at the forefront of the global transition towards cleaner and more sustainable transportation. By focusing on such sectors, Italy is not only seeking to diversify its economic engagement with China but also positioning itself to be part of the vanguard in these emerging industries. Moreover, the emphasis on a balanced trade relationship is a reflection of Italy’s broader economic philosophy. It underscores the importance of ensuring that economic partnerships are mutually beneficial, without compromising the economic sovereignty and interests of either party. This approach is critical in the context of the global economy, where nations are increasingly aware of the need

The world will soon focus on Paris, the host city of the 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games. The town was chosen to host the games in 2018 due to its significant attributes, such as the utilisation of its iconic historic landmarks and its overall heritage. The bid was also praised for its modest and sustainable approach, emphasising the legacy of the Games. While sustainability is a fundamental aspect of the International Olympic Committee’s Olympic Agenda 2020 roadmap, recent Olympics have faced criticism for unmet commitments and accusations of greenwashing. This raises the critical question: how sustainable will the Paris 2024 Games be? To evaluate this, we will analyse the sustainability of the games based on three pillars: environmental, social, and economic. 1 Martin Müller & Sven Daniel Wolfe & Christopher Gaffney & David Gogishvili & Miriam Hug & Annick Leick, 2021. “An evaluation of the sustainability of the Olympic Games,” Nature Sustainability, Nature, vol. 4(4), pages 340-348, April. I. Environmental sustainability Paris 2024 will use 95% of existing sports facilities, therefore minimising construction and environmental impact. The city’s focus on mobility through public transportation,  efforts to improve ecosystems, responsible waste management, and sustainable food sources, as well as high environmental standards for new construction, all contribute to a more optimistic view of the environmental sustainability of the Games. One flagship example is the open water swimming contest planned in the Seine (Paris’ river), which requires tremendous improvement in water quality. Although feasibility is still highly uncertain, it’s part of the flagship “bathing plan” programme. It aims to create bathing sites in the region by improving water quality, thereby promoting a functional ecosystem. Paris 2024 aims to be the first games aligned with the Paris Agreement, signed at COP21. The goal is to achieve a 55% reduction in carbon footprint compared to the London 2012 Games. The plan to use existing infrastructure makes this reduction achievable. However, the need for more transparency in the carbon footprint assessment affects its credibility, especially in calculating international travel emissions, which make up a significant portion of the Games’ carbon footprint II. Social sustainability Firstly, the public approval process has been handled superficially, with limited surveys and the idea that the consultation processes ensure the support of the population and civil society. Secondly, the Games will be held in two main areas: Paris, to showcase the city’s rich heritage, with competitions at the foot of the Eiffel Tower, and the Seine-Saint-Denis département. This poor suburban department has a young, cosmopolitan population. It stands to benefit significantly from the legacy of the Games and the facilities built, including housing, sports facilities, and urban transport. However, one can be concerned about the potential adverse effects on local populations, such as gentrification and rising rents, as seen in the Stratford district following the London 2012 Games. Thirdly, despite high sustainability standards, problems remain, particularly regarding the social aspect. The use of undocumented workers has been revealed, and the displacement of populations, although ordinary features of Games and probably

The two challenges of the Indian power sector Access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy is critical to basic human needs. Energy availability and quality are also vital for economic activities and national competitiveness. Over the past two decades, India has bridged the gap in electricity access, providing electricity to 730 million people, mainly rural households, covering almost the entire Indian population (99.6%). India has recognised the energy sector’s potential in combating climate change. India’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) includes a 45% reduction in the emissions intensity of its GDP by 2030. The power sector is the largest emitter in the country and plays a crucial role in meeting emissions targets. India has committed to achieving approximately 50% cumulative installed capacity in non-fossil fuel-based energy sources by 2030. India is moving towards a low-carbon energy sector by doubling its renewable energy production capacity in the past ten years and setting ambitious targets for the future.  Basics of electricity and Indian power policies Household connection is the very end of the electric network: electricity is produced, and transmitted, sometimes for thousands of kilometres to a consumer that shall be individually connected to the network (so-called « distribution »). For optimal network functioning, i.e. minimising electric losses and avoiding shutdowns, the network shall be optimised and production shall meet the demand, at any time of the day. In addition, intermittent renewable energy like wind or solar cannot be produced 24 hours a day and must be complemented by consistent sources. Therefore, India’s increase in renewable production and electricity access results from careful planning at the central level and declination in the vast territory. In 2003, as part of a strategic strategy for energy security, India took a decisive step in its energy policy through the National Energy Act. The policy allowed renewable energy into the mix, taking advantage of India’s massive solar and wind potential and rationalising electric production and network expansion through 5-year planning. The National Electricity Plans assess needs, potential and set targets. In the last ten years, although discrepancies between the plan and the reality occurred, the sector was scrutinised, and a large set of policy measures were implemented to correct and allow the country to reach its goals. Snapshot of the electricity sector as of today The installed capacity was around 100 GW in 2001, 72 GW thermal capacity, and 25 GW renewables. By 2022, the installed capacity is almost 400 GW, of which 157 GW is renewables (see graphs for more details of the current energy mix). Coal-based energy is one of the cheapest sources and is the backbone of India’s energy production. It is now supplanted by renewables addition: over the past five years, thermal capacity increased by 31 GW, mainly coal, whereas renewables increased by 55 GW with a significant contribution from solar (41 GW). Nevertheless, keeping up with India’s population and economic development demands appears challenging. Despite a slight energy deficit, the installed capacity still fails to meet the electric requirement and peak demand. In